The Channel Islands 1941-45: Hitler's Impregnable Fortress Review

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The Channel Islands 1941-45: Hitler's Impregnable Fortress ReviewIn Osprey's Fortress #41, Charles Stephen describes the German occupation and fortification of the British Channel Islands in the Second World War. Despite the fact that these fortifications were never used in combat, this topic remains noteworthy as the only slice of British territory ever occupied by Germany in the world wars as well as one of the most heavily fortified parts of the Atlantic Wall. Stephenson's descriptions of the fortifications on the islands are quite good and there is plenty of detail here for bunker enthusiasts. Color plates detail items ranging from individual machinegun positions, up to the massive naval direction finding towers and 12-inch gun batteries on Guernsey. However, the author digresses a bit on such topics as the use of forced labor and the round-up of Jewish residents, and thereby slights a more detailed look at the actual fortress garrison.
The author's introduction outlines the history of fortification efforts on the islands dating back to 1066 and then up to the German occupation in July 1940. I was a bit disappointed that that author did not mention the large-scale use of Fiesler Storch light airplanes to ferry a German infantry battalion over to the islands - probably one of the more unique `airmobile operations' in history. The author details Hitler's decision in October 1941 to turn the islands into an `impregnable fortress' and estimates that 10-12% of all effort on the Atlantic Wall went into this one project. One particularly useful section is "Anatomy of an Impregnable Fortress," which has three maps that show all the major gun positions and bunkers on the islands. The core of the book is the 24-page section entitled "the principles of defense," which describes the coastal and air defenses, tunnel systems and armored forces available on the islands. Overall, the author provides a good, succinct technical description of the major fortifications on the islands.
In the 13-page section, "the living site," the author discusses the fortress builders, the occupiers and the occupiers. The author gets a bit off track here, devoting a bit too much attention to German abuse of forced laborers and the handful of Jewish residents on the island. Unfortunately, the author has much less to say about Organization Todt that planned the construction or the 319th Infantry Division that manned the fortifications. Basic facts, like the commander of the division (von Schmettow), the division's organization and dispositions on the islands, and the strength of Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine units on the islands just don't get the attention needed here. Simply listing the garrison strength in a lump total of 23-26,000 in 1944 just doesn't tell the reader very much. In failing to discuss the 319th dispositions on the islands or any specific plans for defense, it renders the maps of fortifications rather sterile. Although the author frequently compares these fortifications with similar ones in Normandy, it is clear that the circumstances were very different; in Normandy the defenders merely had to delay the Allies for 24-48 hours until the panzer reserves could deploy, but in the Channel islands there was little hope for reinforcements. Once the crust defense was broken, these defenses on the islands could not have held out for long.
This volume also suffers from overly limited discussion of logistic issues, indeed, the maps do not even depict airfields on the islands. There is virtually no discussion of German air-sea (or U-Boat) communication with the islands, or with efforts to stockpile supplies (he does discuss tunnel construction, but it sounds like few were completed or stocked). A fortress has to be built to withstand a protracted siege and it does not appear that the Germans made adequate provision in this regard. While the author discusses cannibalism among forced labor prisoners, he does not mention the serious food shortages after D-Day which seriously degraded the garrison. Indeed, the German garrison became so desperate for supplies that they mounted a bold raid on Granville in March 1945, which did achieve some success. Why does the author mention several small British commando raids on outlying islands, but not the Granville raid. The author also fails to mention offensive uses for the island, including German anti-shipping raids against channel coastal convoys.
The volume ends with the German surrender and does include a nice bibliography, but a noticeable lack of analysis about the value of these fortifications. Stephenson does suggest early on that the expenditure of so much effort on islands that had little or no military value was a mistake that benefited the Allies, but there wasn't much analysis behind that assertion. Actually, a case can be made that the islands did have military value because they were within 30-40 miles of Cherbourg and could have provided excellent forward fighter bases if seized prior to D-Day. This was in fact a fairly common method used to support big amphibious operations in the Pacific. While an island like Guernsey was heavily fortified, it was also very isolated and could have been reduced in a 3-5 day operation. The lives lost in the operation could be weighed against the lives saved on D-day through better air support and by providing radar beacons for paratroop transports going to the nearby Cotentin peninsula. The German decision to fortify these islands was not some crazy whim of Hitler's but a military appreciation that offshore staging bases like these offered a potential threat if left unguarded. Perhaps the effort on these islands was extravagant, but in light of actual figures it is hard to evaluate. What can be evaluated is Hitler did want the Allies to land on these islands and by fortifying them to the extent he did, he deterred invasion, meaning that they did accomplish their intended mission.
The Channel Islands 1941-45: Hitler's Impregnable Fortress OverviewFollowing the Fall of France and the surrender of Paris on 14 June 1940, the British Government announced that the Channel Islands had no strategic importance and would not be defended. The Germans occupied the islands from the end of June onwards and remained in control until the end of the war. On 10 October 1941 Hitler announced his intention to 'convert them into an impregnable fortress', and the islands formed the most heavily fortified and defended section of the entire Atlantic Wall. This book describes the design, construction and manning of these defensive positions, as well as considering more widely the occupation of the Channel Islands by the Germans.

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